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Legal and political science scholars omit an important variable in explaining compliance with 
ECJ rulings: the fine-tuning in the follow-up cases. This paper shows with the Kohll/Decker 
social policy jurisprudence that, first, the Court applied the principles of free movement of 
services and goods to the Luxembourg health care system in the initial rulings in this series of 
cases and thereby challenged the institutional configuration of national welfare states. Step by 
step the ECJ extended the legal principles to other Member States and to similar cases. At the 
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limiting the impact of its decisions largely to the less costly ambulatory sector. This fine-tuning of 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
Paul Pierson (2004) and others (see e.g. Abbott 2001; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) (re-) 
introduced the concept of time into political science in the early 2000s. Pierson claimed that 
while many important social processes unfold over longer periods of time, most scholars focus 
on the immediate (2004: 79). This paper will pay attention to this concern: It will start from 
the immediate (two leading European Court of Justice rulings) and examine the long-term 
process they caused (the fine-tuning of these two rulings). 
The long-term process I will investigate started in April of 1998, when Kohll and 
Decker2, two key European Court of Justice (ECJ) social policy rulings, were decided. Initially, 
all EU Member States that had commented on these cases in the written and oral proceedings 
before the Court refused the implementation of the legal principles of these rulings (see e.g. 
Palm et al. 2000; Jorens and Hajdú 2005). The recurrent argument used was that these leading 
cases unjustifiably interfered in the organisation of domestic social protection systems, a 
domain reserved exclusively to EU Member States. Among other Member States, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom (UK) refused to accept that the rulings, which were aimed at 
Luxembourg’s social security system, were transferable to their own systems. The French 
government even went so far as to instruct its insurance funds to disregard the rulings 
altogether.3 Concomitantly to the rejection by Member State governments, political and legal 
science accounts postulated – based on the doctrinal content of Kohll and Decker – the 
destruction of domestic social protection systems (see e.g. Ferrera 2005; Leibfried 2005; 
Martinsen 2005a). However, Kohll and Decker were only the beginning; follow-up rulings 
fine-tuned these cases.4 Fine-tuning will be understood here as the extension and/or 
limitation of the scope of judicial doctrines elaborated in a leading case in the follow-up 
rulings. 
                                          
1 I would like to thank the following persons for their comments and insights: Gerda Falkner, Stephan Leibfried, 
Klaus Sieveking, Reinhard Slepcevic and Peter Slominski. 
2 Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll vs. Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-120/95, Nicolas 
Decker vs. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831. 
3 See a circular of the Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité from 29 June 1998, in possession of the author. 
4 The series of rulings taken together will be referred to in short as the “Kohll/Decker jurisprudence”. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 5 of 38 
Despite the initial obstruction to the principles enshrined in Kohll and Decker, 
Germany, France and the UK incorporated them into their social codes in a later stage. It 
turned out that Member States did not have to alter core features of their social protection 
systems; the actual impact of the rulings was therefore rather modest when compared to the 
one postulated. What role did the ECJ’s fine-tuning in the follow-up rulings to Kohll and 
Decker play in all this? Did the fine-tuning interact with domestic implementation efforts? 
The present paper transcends existing models of judicial politics, understood as the 
impact of a court’s case law on how legislators and administrators take decisions. 
Conventional models of judicial politics have conceived the ECJ either as a strategic rational 
actor that tries to accommodate Member States’ preferences (see e.g. Garrett 1995; Garrett et 
al. 1998; Alter 2001; Hartley 2007), or as an autonomous judicial actor that exercises 
considerable discretion vis-à-vis Member States (see e.g. Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet 
2004; Cichowski 2007). I argue that the ECJ in the Kohll/Decker  jurisprudence oscillated 
between “judicial activism” and “self-restraint”. According to Hjalte Rasmussen, judicial 
activism “connotes regular judicial policy-making in pursuance of policy-objectives which 
usurp the rule and policy-making powers of other branches of government” (1998: 26–27). 
The concept of judicial self-restraint is “commonly used to designate the situation in which 
judges defer their judgements to some extent … to the political branches of government” 
(Rasmussen 1986: 33). I claim that the ECJ is both a strategic and an autonomous actor. It 
enjoys considerable autonomy from Member State interference and has its own agenda of 
applying EC law uniformly across Member States. At the same time, its autonomy is 
constrained by Member State interests, especially when their core functions are affected. 
Ultimately, the Court wants to ensure that Member States accept its rulings and incorporate 
them in their laws and administrative practices. 
If we want to observe the (partially contradicting) aims of applying EC law uniformly 
and of guaranteeing compliance at work, we have to take a look at three distinct layers of 
judicial politics. The first layer consists of a leading case (or cases) in which the ECJ decides a Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 6 of 38 
question of principle and lays down the material5 doctrines with which the question at hand 
has to be answered. The second layer consists of an ensuing process of fine-tuning the 
principles developed in the leading case in follow-up rulings. Even though, outside the formal 
structure of interaction between the ECJ, national courts, the European Commission and 
Member State governments6, communication is categorically denied7, they engage in a subtle 
“dialogue” via the fine-tuning process. If the ECJ has delivered a key ruling for a specific 
question in a specific country, further questions about its actual scope remain open. To close 
this gap, national courts submit additional preliminary questions. This may either concern 
another Member State, potentially with a different system, or it may regard a different 
question related to the first ruling. The ECJ in the course of fine-tuning its decisions then 
applies the principles elaborated earlier to other Member States and other case constellations. 
At the same time, it further refines the already existing principles and adds new ones. This 
process of fine-tuning the jurisprudence leads to the third layer of judicial politics: interaction 
of ECJ rulings and implementation processes at the Member State level. The repeated 
interaction between national courts (as well as Member State governments in the proceedings) 
and the ECJ allows the latter to steadily refine its earlier rulings. In doing so, the Court is able 
to accommodate concerns and criticism by Member State governments. In turn, the fine-
tuning may help to overcome Member State non-compliance, it may help governments and 
national courts to better understand the meaning and impact of the ECJ decisions, and it may 
allow governments to draw horizontal conclusions for their implementation.8 
In the remainder of this paper I proceed as follows: First, I elaborate the different 
conceptualisations of judicial politics and their differences along the lines of legal uncertainty 
and its consequences, Member State preferences and ECJ precedent (1). Second, I explain how 
                                          
5 I adopt the distinction between structural and material doctrines by Joseph Weiler. For him, a structural 
doctrine lays down a “normative framework that purports to govern fundamental issues, such as the structure of 
relationships between Community and member states,“ whereas a material doctrine does “the same in relation 
to, for example, the economic and social content of that relationship” (1994: 512). 
6 See Section 4 EC Treaty, as well as the statute and the rules of procedure of the ECJ. For a detailed description 
of the procedural framework in preliminary rulings see Granger (2004: 5–7). 
7 Interviews in the framework of my doctoral thesis with an ECJ advocate general as well as with staff from the 
ECJ have confirmed this. 
8 With horizontal conclusions I do not only mean that Member States apply the principles elaborated by the ECJ 
to the same cases in their system but also to other similar cases. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 7 of 38 
the ECJ fine-tuned the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence and, in doing this, how it oscillated 
between activism and self-restraint (2). In section three, I present the fine-tuning and its 
impact on implementation in three Member States: France, Germany and the UK (3). The 
fourth part deals with my own conceptualisation of judicial politics (4). Finally, I conclude my 
paper with a short summary of the findings and their consequences for how we assess the 
impact of ECJ rulings on Member States. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 8 of 38 
2. DIFFERING MODELS OF JUDICIAL POLITICS 
EU scholarship has brought forward several explicit and implicit models of judicial politics. 
These models differ along three lines: first, whereas for some authors legal uncertainty caused 
by ECJ rulings precludes policy reform, for others it is the very condition for understanding 
compliance. Second, according to some, the ECJ has developed a fragmented and incoherent 
case law, while for others the Court method was systematic. Third, some authors conceive the 
ECJ as a rational strategic actor that tries to accommodate political interests, whereas others 
see it as an autonomous judicial actor that has considerable discretion vis-à-vis Member 
States. These differences between the models of judicial politics will be further elaborated 
below. 
Classical authors in legal philosophy and legal sociology such as Hans Kelsen (1992, 
reprint), Herbert Hart (1961) and Niklas Luhmann (1987, 3rd edition) have debated at length 
the problem of the indeterminacy which is imminent in law. EU scholarship has taken up this 
debate. Alec Stone Sweet held that “adjudication functions to reduce the indeterminacy of 
legal norms through (a) use, that is, argumentation, interpretation, application, and (b) the 
propagation of argumentation frameworks” (2004: 38). I argue that adjudication also causes 
legal uncertainty9, at least in the short run. This is the case for ECJ rulings that very often 
create a high degree of uncertainty for EU Member States as to how to implement them as 
well as for national courts as to how to apply them. This legal uncertainty is in principle 
similar to the one caused by an EU directive. Nevertheless, the degree and the kind of 
uncertainty are different. Usually, the room for manoeuvring in the case of a directive is more 
circumscribed than it is in a Court ruling, where the case at hand is quite clear, but the 
broader implications are disputed. Whereas a directive is typically formulated in a general way 
                                          
9 Some authors speak of the “indeterminacy” of law (see e.g. Stone Sweet 2004; Blichner and Molander 2008). 
According to Lars Blichner and Anders Molander, “[i]ndeterminacy arises when it is unclear what rules to apply 
to a certain case or how a certain rule is to be interpreted” (2008: 45). Fritz Scharpf spoke of “[t]he ‘creative 
ambiguity’ created by the Courts’s dicta” (1997: 7). I prefer to use the term “uncertainty” because I do not study 
the law in a proper sense but ECJ rulings which cause uncertainty as to how to implement and apply them. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 9 of 38 
and binds all Member States, a Court ruling often relies on a general principle and applies it to 
a specific country and a specific case at hand.10 
 
2.1.  Legal Uncertainty and its Consequences 
Scholars who assess the consequences of legal uncertainty – resulting from ECJ rulings – for 
compliance come to quite different conclusions. Lisa Conant argues that legal uncertainty has 
rather a “negative” effect on implementation. According to her, “[u]ncertainty about the 
extension of legal principles across cases precludes rapid policy reform” (2003: 52). In 
contrast, many authors state that legal uncertainty is important in understanding ECJ rulings 
and their implementation. Susanne K. Schmidt claimed that the Court consciously establishes 
fuzzy new principles of law. In a longer series of cases, the ECJ is then able to see the reactions 
and preferences of national courts, judicial commentators and politics in general, and can, if 
necessary, modify its jurisprudence (2004: 36). According to Schmidt, the implications of a 
ruling have to be translated to other cases in the follow-up jurisprudence in which the real 
scope of its doctrines is determined. This facilitates the acceptance of rulings. When follow-up 
cases are judged after a certain lapse of time, the original doctrines are already established 
(ibid: 37). Similarly, Ulrich Everling found that whenever the ECJ enters new terrain, it first 
decides in very general terms and then specifies, complements, restricts or rectifies its 
doctrines, dependent on the legal discussion and emerging problems (2000: 224). Trevor C. 
Hartley observed a pattern of the institutionalisation of legal principles elaborated by the ECJ: 
A common tactic [of the ECJ, AJO] is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that 
comes before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle, but suggest that it is subject 
to various qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it should not be applied to the 
particular facts of the case. The principle, however, is now established. If there are not too many 
                                          
10 It is still contested whether ECJ decisions exert a formal binding effect inter partes or erga omnes. However, it is 
obvious that there is an informal binding effect, which generally makes national courts and EU Member States 
respect the ECJ principles. Some Member States have established centralised mechanisms, which are used to 
monopolise the interpretation of ECJ rulings and to decide on the further implications of those rulings. For 
instance, the Netherlands and the UK have such mechanisms. In the Dutch administration, every ECJ decision is 
analysed according to a fixed procedure by a group of civil servants that looks at the possible effects for national 
policy and legislation. Then a fiche is drawn and distributed among high civil servants and, if necessary, 
transmitted to the cabinet. This formal system amounts to an acceptance of the erga omnes effect of ECJ 
decisions. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 10 of 38 
protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the qualifications can then be whittled away and the full 
extent of the doctrine revealed (2007: 76). 
 
However, this rather prudent approach by the ECJ is – according to Hartley – only employed 
in cases in which its decisions present a challenge to the interests of national governments 
(ibid). 
 
2.2.  ECJ Rulings and Precedent 
The ECJ, like all legal institutions, relies to a certain extent on precedent. The scope of this 
reliance on precedent, however, is debated; different conceptualisations of precedent are 
brought forward. On an abstract level, according to Stone Sweet, precedent allows judges to 
decrease indeterminacy (2004: 32). Formal argumentation frameworks, that is discursive 
doctrinal structures, “condition how litigants and judges pursue their self-interest, social 
justice, or other values through adjudication” (ibid: 34–35). On a more concrete level, 
according to Thorsten Kingreen, the ECJ inches its way forward in the area of free movement 
of services and social policy. Therefore, every interpreter of the jurisprudence on the basic 
freedoms runs the risk of reading too much into the ECJ rulings and of then deducing general 
statements which are changed in the follow-up jurisprudence (2003: 368). Vassilis 
Hatzopoulos noticed a “fragmented and apparently incoherent case law” of the ECJ 
specifically in the field of free movement of services. According to him, this “might be the 
result of the current tendency of the Court to give specific answers to specific questions, rather 
than to deliver generally applicable rules” (2000: 52–55). 
Contrary to these views, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen depicted “a Court that applies a 
systematic method of ‘gap-filling,’ where the line of a legal principle is gradually being drawn 
and extended to a new policy field.” For Martinsen, “[t]he full scope and consequence of the 
legal deduction is revealed from case to case and, in the case of healthcare, evidently remains 
in a formative process” (2005b: 1036). Martinsen cited the two Pierik11 decisions by the ECJ in 
the 1970s as evidence that “a judicial doctrine in formation ultimately must be politically 
                                          
11 Case 117/77, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland vs. G. Pierik [1978] ECR 825; Case 
182/78, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland vs. G. Pierik [1979] ECR 1977. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 11 of 38 
supported, and that, if individual litigation proceeds excessively in terms of financial and 
political implications, the member states will seek to mobilise joint action against the Court’s 
interpretative course” (2005b: 1038). 
Precedent not only shapes the behaviour of the ECJ but also that of actors before the 
Court. Margaret McCown found that for legal interinstitutional disputes between the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, “the dynamics of precedent-based 
decision-making [by the ECJ, AJO] come to constrain even quite hostile actors” (2003: 978). 
To win a case, actors before the Court advance much of the precedent’s arguments instead of 
fighting against the original case: 
Litigants respond quite defensively to ECJ decisions: rather than devoting immense resources to 
challenging entire decisions, they tend to advance qualifying arguments in which they simply try to 
distinguish their case from a disliked precedent. In doing this, however, they are left implicitly 
acceding to the precedents (ibid: 980). 
 
 
2.3.  ECJ Rulings and Member State Preferences 
The question of whether the ECJ defers its rulings to Member State preferences is contested. 
For those who accept the political nature of ECJ rulings the actual extent of this deferral is 
debated. 
Geoffrey Garrett outlined a rational model for government-ECJ interactions and 
conceived the ECJ as a strategic actor in this game. Its power “depends critically on the 
continuing acquiescence of national governments. As a result, the court’s judicial activism is 
constrained by the reactions they [the justices, AJO] anticipate from [powerful, AJO] member 
governments to their decisions” (1995: 173). Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz investigated three 
lines of cases (non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade, equal treatment, and state liability for 
the violation of EU law), in which “Court activism has been tempered by the preferences of 
the member governments” (1998: 174). Also Karen Alter advocated a strategic and political 
role of courts. According to her, 
[c]ourts act strategically vis-à-vis other courts, and vis-à-vis political bodies, calculating the political 
context in which they operate so as to avoid provoking a response which will close access, remove 
jurisdictional authority, or reverse their decisions (2001: 46). 
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In contrast, according to Stone Sweet, the ECJ possesses considerable discretion. This is so for 
three reasons: the Court received delegated powers from Member States; their control 
mechanisms toward the ECJ are weak; and the Court builds on previous jurisprudence (2004: 
23–27). However, Stone Sweet also admitted that indirect controls are effective, but “only 
insofar as the judges internalize the interests of the contracting parties, or take cues from the 
revealed preferences of the latter, and act accordingly” (ibid: 26). Similar models also have 
pointed to the considerable autonomy of the ECJ to foster European integration (see e.g. 
Slaughter et al. 1998; Cichowski 2007). 
That EU Member States have the power to overrule ECJ rulings is not contested. In fact, 
Member States have used this tool in several cases12: for instance in the two Pierik decisions 
and in Barber13. In the Pierik rulings at the end of the 1970s, the ECJ held that treatment 
abroad had to be authorised when the foreign treatment was recognised as necessary and 
effective, even if it was not offered in the health package of the state of insurance. As a 
reaction, the Council unanimously amended EC Regulation 1408/71, and inhibited the 
“regime-shopping” effects of the Pierik rulings (see Martinsen 2005b: 1037–1039). In the 
Barber case from 1990, “the Court ruled that sex-based differences in pensionable ages 
violated Article 119 [EC Treaty, AJO] and had to be eliminated” (Garrett et al. 1998: 166). 
Member States were “extremely worried by the enormous financial implications” of Barber 
and, therefore, added a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty that limited the retrospective 
application of the Barber principles (ibid: 166). These two examples show that EU Member 
States have the ability to constrain ECJ rulings especially in areas which are sensitive for 
Member States, such as social policy. 
 
2.4.  Models of Judicial Politics and their Shortcomings 
The foregoing explicit and implicit models of judicial politics have three major shortcomings. 
First, the existing studies usually do not incorporate the proceedings before the Court, but rely 
                                          
12 Damian Chalmers (2004: 14) identified four examples of amendments to the EC Treaty to counteract an ECJ 
decision. Though, he did not count amended secondary legislation. 
13 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber vs. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 13 of 38 
solely on the rulings and the legal discussion around them (see e.g. Garrett et al. 1998: 162–
169). As an exception, Stone Sweet draws his account from a data set on Member State and 
Commission observations and their power to presage ECJ rulings (2004: 43). However, he 
only determines the congruence of Member State observations and ECJ rulings superficially, 
without going into detail. Karen Alter cast doubt on our ability to establish governments’ 
positions and interests regarding ECJ cases (2006: 314 and 327).14 A second shortcoming is 
that even though many studies integrate lines of rulings (see e.g. Garrett et al. 1998; Stone 
Sweet 2004), especially legal science accounts tend to review singular cases without always 
paying attention to longer series of cases (see e.g. Becker 1998; van der Mei 1999; Künkele 
2000). The third and most important shortcoming is that existing studies do not 
systematically incorporate the interaction between ECJ fine-tuning and Member State 
implementation. This neglect in particular stems from the difficulty of linking specific court 
rulings to national implementation. 
This paper tries to remedy the identified shortcomings. First, I argue that it is 
necessary to investigate the proceedings before the Court systematically and also to consider 
Member States’ statements on ECJ rulings. It does not suffice to establish the congruence of 
Member State observations and ECJ rulings as Stone Sweet and others have done, and then to 
deduce that Member States were “successful” (2004: 184–188). In order to be able to 
reconstruct Member State preferences, I investigated the opinions of the Advocate General 
who briefly summarises the oral and written proceedings, as well as the reports of the hearing 
that can easily be requested from the ECJ. Both sources shed sufficient light on the different 
initial positions of Member States, the European Commission and the ECJ, as well as their 
change in position. In addition, the available documents provided indications for answering 
the question as to whether and how the Court deferred its position to the preferences of 
Member States. A second improvement: I analysed a longer series of cases from 1998 to 2006 
                                          
14 According to Marie-Pierre Granger, “assessing the influence of governmental observations on the Court’s 
decisions is an impossible task, because of the complexity of the judicial decision-making which cannot be 
reduced to the interventions of a few factors and actors. Causal connections between observations and outcomes 
can not be objectively evidenced” (2004: 27). However, she concedes that “a detailed case study of legal 
developments in particular areas could provide more valuable evidence as to the actual influence of governments’ 
observations” (ibid: 28). Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 14 of 38 
in order to incorporate the ECJ’s fine-tuning into the analysis. Thus, I am able to show the 
interaction between the development of the ECJ jurisprudence and Member State compliance. 
A third improvement is that I linked specific rulings to specific Member State policy responses 
in order to determine the effects of rulings on Member State policies. I assessed many 
different types of documents on Member State and EU-levels: legal texts dealing with 
legislative or administrative changes as a response to ECJ and national court rulings, 
ministerial circulars, press releases, parliamentary debates, European Commission 
documents, etc. Through careful process-tracing (see e.g. George and Bennett 2005), I 
attributed a specific policy response at the Member State level to a specific ruling. I paid 
special attention to the time sequencing of national changes and was thus able to separate the 
impact of court rulings from other possible factors, such as changing domestic policy 
preferences. The insights I gained were finally refined with the help of 25 problem-centred 
interviews with experts from both the Member State and EU-levels.15 Thus, I could gain a 
more encompassing understanding of compliance with ECJ rulings. 
In order to fulfil the above described task of improving our knowledge of judicial politics, 
I examined the refinement of a series of important social policy cases on patient mobility. This 
line of rulings started with Kohll and Decker in 1998 and was followed chronologically by 
Vanbraekel and Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms in 2001, Müller-Fauré/van Riet and Inizan in 2003, 
Leichtle in 2004, Keller in 2005, and most recently, Watts and Acereda Herrera in 2006.16  
                                          
15 In the framework of my doctoral thesis I conducted 25 problem-centred expert interviews in Germany, France, 
the UK, Austria, Brussels and Luxemburg. On the one hand, I conducted interviews with actors on the 
supranational level: members of the legal staff of the DG Internal Market who were engaged in monitoring and 
promoting the implementation of EU Member States, staff members of the DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities who were monitoring the correct implementation of Regulation 1408/71, staff members of 
the DG Health and Consumer Protection who were keeping a watch on health being incorporated into all 
Community policies, and members of European interest groups, such as the Association Internationale de la 
Mutualité and the European Social Insurance Platform. On the other hand, more importantly, on the Member 
State level, in Germany, France, and the UK, I interviewed ministerial officials who were concerned with the 
implementation of ECJ rulings, officials of compulsory health insurance funds who were dealing with European 
law, and independent academic experts who followed the respective internal and European processes. The 
assembled expert interviews have been coded and analysed with the help of Atlas.ti, a qualitative document 
analysis software package. The results were incorporated into the analysis. 
16 Case C-368/98, Abdon Vanbraekel and Others vs. Alliance Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes [2001] ECR I-
5363; Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits vs. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms vs. Stichting CZ 
Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99, V.G. Müller-Fauré vs. Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet vs. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 15 of 38 
3. FINE-TUNING DOCTRINES BY THE ECJ: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND 
SELF-RESTRAINT 
The incremental unfolding of the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence is a paradigmatic example of 
how the ECJ fine-tunes its case law and thereby oscillates between judicial activism and self-
restraint, and of how it behaves as both an autonomous and strategic actor. 
 
3.1.  Kohll and Decker – Revolution or evolution? 
Kohll and Decker had been expected by legal scholars for a long time. These two rulings 
redrew the borders between national and EC social security law, based on the basic freedoms 
of providing services and goods. In Kohll, a Luxembourg citizen was refused authorisation by 
his Luxembourg health insurance for an orthodontist ambulatory treatment in Germany for 
his daughter. His request was rejected because the treatment was not deemed urgent and 
could have been carried out in Luxembourg. In Decker, Nicolas Decker was refused 
reimbursement by his Luxembourg health insurance for a pair of spectacles he had bought in 
Belgium using a prescription from a Luxembourg ophthalmologist. The justification here was 
that Decker had not sought prior authorisation as demanded by the Health Insurance Code of 
Luxembourg at that time. 
In the Kohll and Decker proceedings before the ECJ (1995–1997), all EU Member 
States agreed in their written observations – thirteen had submitted such an observation – that 
either the freedom to provide services did not apply to national social protection systems or 
that, if it applied, prior authorisation procedures for health care consumption abroad were 
justified.17 Member States adopted two slightly different lines of defence. On the one hand, the 
                                                                                                                                   
ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-56/01, Patricia Inizan vs. Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie 
des Hauts-de-Seine [2003] ECR I-12403; Case C-08/02, Ludwig Leichtle vs. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-
2641; Case C-145/03, Heirs of Annette Keller vs. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social [2005] ECR I-2529; 
Case C-372/04, The Queen on the application of Yvonne Watts vs. 1) Bedford Primary Care Trust 2) Secretary of 
State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325; Case C-466/04, Manuel Acereda Herrera vs. Servicio Cántabro de Salud 
[2006] ECR I-5341. 
17 Stone Sweet and others examined the relationships “between the arguments contained in the observations filed 
by the Commission and the Member States, for each case, and the Court’s ultimate decision” (2004: 186). This Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 16 of 38 
French and German governments claimed that an uncoordinated opening of the markets for 
pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and medical care would seriously endanger the very 
structure of the national systems of social security (see ECJ, Rapport d’audience, Kohll: paras 
53–60, 64–72; and Decker: paras 29–46, 53–64). The French government postulated that the 
equilibrium of all Luxembourg-style social security systems, such as its own, would be at stake, 
if the principle of territoriality was to be breached (see ECJ, Rapport d’audience, Kohll: para. 
68). On the other hand, the UK government tried to differentiate its National Health Service 
from social security systems. It stated that Articles 49 and 50 EC Treaty did not apply to 
systems which are financed by public funds (ibid: para. 85). 
The European Commission argued in the Decker proceeding that the free movement 
of goods precluded national restrictions (see ECJ, Rapport d’audience, Decker: para. 89). In 
Kohll, it stated that prior authorisation procedures violated the freedom to provide services in 
general, but that for reasons of general interest, restrictions were justified (see ECJ, Rapport 
d’audience, Kohll: para. 104). 
In its Kohll ruling, the Court of Justice observed, first, that, “according to settled case-
law, Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organise their 
social security systems” (para. 17). However, Member States “must nevertheless comply with 
Community law when exercising those powers” (ibid: para. 19). Second, the ECJ determined 
that a national regulation, which made the reimbursement of dental treatment abroad 
dependent on the prior authorisation of the competent insurance institution, as it was in place 
in Luxembourg, did violate the (passive) free movement of services, Articles 49 and 50 EC 
Treaty, and was neither justified by the control of health expenditures nor by the balancing of 
the budget of the social protection systems (ibid: paras 35, 42 and 54). Even though the 
Luxembourg Cour de Cassation asked two rather general preliminary questions, the ECJ only 
                                                                                                                                   
effort aimed at answering the question of whether these observations presage or influence the Court’s rulings. I 
have undertaken a similar effort for the cases Kohll and Decker. I have coded the observations in these two cases 
as “successful” or “unsuccessful” of predicting the final decision. The results of the examination are included in 
the following section. However, I refrained from iterating this for the follow-up rulings, mainly for two reasons: 
firstly, many preliminary questions entail more than one question; Watts for instance comprises seven questions. 
In addition, sometimes there was congruence only in a part of the questions. Therefore, it was impossible to code 
the observations in “successful” and “unsuccessful”. Secondly, the follow-up rulings are sometimes of such 
technical detail that it is not always possible to determine doubtlessly the (non-) congruence of observations and 
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responded to the very specific Luxembourg case at hand regarding dental treatment. In its 
preliminary Decker ruling, the ECJ held that requiring prior authorisation for the purchase of 
medical products abroad violated the free movement of goods guaranteed in Articles 28 and 
30 EC Treaty (para. 36). 
None of the thirteen written Member State’s observations could presage Kohll and 
Decker. All Member States agreed that either free movement of services and goods could not 
be applied to social protection systems, or they perceived national restrictions as justified. The 
European Commission’s observations could presage the ruling in Decker but only partly in 
Kohll. Thus, in these two rulings, the ECJ clearly did not defer its decisions to the preferences 
of Member States. 
Kohll and Decker created a second avenue of cross-border health care in addition to 
EC Regulation 1408/71 on social protection for migrant workers (see Jorens 2002: 110): 
patients could from then on seek medical treatment in another EU Member State without 
depending on the discretion of their domestic insurance institutions. These two cases held 
that ambulatory treatment and spectacles could be purchased abroad, in social security 
systems organised like Luxembourg’s that provide health care through cash reimbursement. 
The implications for national health systems and health insurance systems based on delivering 
primarily in-kind benefits, as well as the consequences for other types of benefits such as 
hospital care, were unclear. Initially, most Member States refrained from implementing the 
jurisprudence because of this uncertainty, i.e. they did not change administrative practices 
and the law in the social codes (see e.g. Palm et al. 2000). However, of more importance was 
that they saw the jurisprudence – as a whole – as an unjustified intrusion into their exclusive 
right to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems guaranteed in Art. 
137(4) EC Treaty. 
In the years following Kohll and Decker, an intense debate at political, administrative, 
and academic levels, both nationally and supranationally, took place on how these rulings had 
to be interpreted and what their expected impact would be. These controversial debates will be 
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In the debate at the political level, Kohll and Decker were considered an “explosive 
issue” (Gobrecht 1999: 17) and a “big bang” (Schulte 2005: 46) in 1998, provoking a major stir 
in many EU Member States. Kohll and Decker prompted vivid debates in the Council of 
Ministers and in the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers.18 
Some politicians called for political action at the EU-level to overrule or blockade these 
rulings. However, no joint action followed. According to Willy Palm et al., the government’s 
responses concerning the implementation of Kohll and Decker were “defensive and 
disorganised” (2000: 98). They also noted that “[e]ven though the Member States consulted 
each other, formally or informally, on the measures or stance to be taken following the 
rulings, in terms of public opinion the strategy taken was very much a conspiracy of silence 
and rejection” (ibid: 78). All in all, most Member State politicians rejected the jurisprudence 
as well as the application of it to their health system. 
By contrast, in the scholarly legal debate, the rulings Kohll and Decker were not 
perceived as a novelty but rather a logical continuation of the dynamic development of EC law 
(see Jorens 2004: 380). Anne Pieter van der Mei found it even “remarkable that it took so long 
before the questions on the compatibility of prior authorisation rules … were submitted to the 
Court” (1999: 14). Regardless of the assessment of Kohll and Decker “as a logical evolution and 
not as a revolution” (Schulte 2003: 170), many legal scholars ascribed a considerable (doctrinal 
and financial) impact on national systems to them. 
Standing “on the shoulders of doctrinal writers” (Arnull 2008: 425), political scientists 
highlighted the groundbreaking potentials of the rulings Kohll and Decker. In the quasi-
absence of “positive”19 social policy integration at the EU-level, “innovative” and “pioneering” 
ECJ rulings were considered to be “path-breaking” in a positive or negative sense in that they 
would significantly change the internal institutional configuration of domestic social 
protection systems and would gradually weaken or tear apart the exclusive national spatial 
                                          
18  T h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  for Migrant Workers is composed of Member State 
representatives of the Ministries of Social Affairs, Employment and Health and assures the correct application of 
EC Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72. 
19  Stephan Leibfried distinguished between “positive” social policy initiatives “taken at the ‘centre’ by the 
Commission and the Council” to develop uniform social standards at the EU level, “negative” reforms “through 
the imposition of market compatibility requirements,” and “indirect pressures” of European integration (2005: 
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demarcation lines and closure practices (see e.g. Ferrera 2005; Leibfried 2005; Martinsen 
2005a). Stephan Leibfried, Maurizio Ferrera and others assumed that the ECJ rulings would 
provoke enormous political and financial costs. However, these assessments focused on the 
legal doctrines elaborated by the ECJ and not on the actual implementation of these doctrines. 
Therefore, Leibfried added that the real influence of ECJ rulings on social protection systems 
still remained “opaque and continuously contested” (2005: 265). 
In the light of these assessments, what happened to the Kohll and Decker principles in 
the follow-up jurisprudence? 
 
3.2.  The Follow-up Jurisprudence: Extending and Narrowing down 
Doctrines 
The aforementioned assessments were based on the originally rather broad material ECJ 
doctrines in Kohll and Decker: the free movement of services and goods precludes national 
rules in Luxembourg-style health systems which subject reimbursement of ambulatory 
treatment and health care products to prior authorisation. The following part will show that in 
the follow-up cases, these doctrines were both extended to other types of health care systems, 
to other states, and to additional areas, and simultaneously narrowed down. 
After Kohll and Decker were decided in 1998, most EU Member States carried on their 
efforts to persuade the ECJ of the peculiar non-economic nature of their social protection 
systems and of the dangers of an unrestricted application of the basic freedoms. This can be 
seen in the proceedings before the Court in the pending cases Vanbraekel and Geraets-
Smits/Peerbooms. However, the unanimous front of rejecting the Kohll/Decker principles 
altogether started to crumble slowly. Two groups of countries can be discerned. Whereas EU 
Member States like France, Belgium and Austria conceded that health care services were of an 
economic nature, the others continued to deny this (see Opinion of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 
Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, para. 32). All Member States agreed that in any case, prior 
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Vanbraekel and Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms were finally decided in 2001, three years 
after Kohll and Decker. Despite the efforts of Member States in the proceedings, the ECJ found 
again that arguments, which stressed the non-economic nature of health care services and 
denied the application of the free movement of services to social protection systems, could not 
be upheld (see ECJ, Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, paras 48–52). However, the ECJ partially 
accommodated Member State concerns in these two cases. In the Dutch case Geraets-
Smits/Peerbooms, the ECJ admitted that viable justifications existed for excluding hospital care 
from the free movement of services. First, a national system of prior authorisation for hospital 
care was not per se violating European law; for the hospital sector, where planning is required, 
such a system was deemed both “necessary and reasonable” (para. 80). The ECJ thus reacted 
to substantiated Member State concerns, as can be seen in the following remarks: 
Looking at the system set up by the ZFW [the Dutch Sickness Fund Act, AJO], it is clear that, if 
insured persons were at liberty, regardless of the circumstances, to use the services of hospitals with 
which their sickness insurance fund had no contractual arrangements, whether they were situated in 
the Netherlands or in another Member State, all the planning which goes into the contractual system 
in an effort to guarantee a rationalised, stable, balanced and accessible supply of hospital services 
would be jeopardised at a stroke (Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, para. 81). 
 
However, second, the ECJ regulated the hospital sector as well: prior authorisation may not be 
refused if an identical or equally effective treatment cannot be obtained without “undue delay” 
from an institution under contract with the competent sickness fund (ibid: paras 103–104). 
Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms “unquestionably determined that systems based on the 
benefits in kind principle do fundamentally fall within the ambit of freedom to provide 
services” (Fuchs 2002: 541) and are thus also affected by the developing exportability of 
domestic health benefits. The ECJ referred primarily to the Dutch system, although according 
to the Court’s reading, 
[i]t must be accepted that a medical service provided in one Member State and paid for by the patient 
should not cease to fall within the scope of the freedom to provide services guaranteed by the Treaty 
merely because reimbursement of the costs of the treatment involved is applied for under another 
Member State’s sickness insurance legislation which is essentially of the type which provides for 
benefits in kind (Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, para. 55). 
 
Nonetheless, some states still wondered how the decision would impact on their health care 
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open whether ambulatory care in EU Member States with in-kind benefit systems had to be 
treated like in those operating with cash benefits. Because of the still undecided questions, for 
the time being, the UK and Germany did not implement the rulings, but only conceded 
negligible changes. The German Working Committee of the Central Associations of Statutory 
Health Insurance Funds even saw its position confirmed that the German in-kind benefit 
system was compatible with the ECJ requirements, when in fact it was not.20 
The Belgian case Vanbraekel further specified the interpretation of EU patient mobility 
provisions: a patient, who had first been refused authorisation which was then granted ex 
post, had to be reimbursed up to the (higher) level of the state of insurance. To sum up 
Vanbraekel and Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, the ECJ upheld its general principle of applying the 
free movement of services to social protection systems. However, the Court was partially 
responsive to Member State interests, because it conceded the first restrictions to the general 
principle. 
Like the foregoing cases, Vanbraekel and Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms did not clarify the 
full scope of the ECJ patient mobility doctrines. To close this gap, a related case was already in 
the pipeline. In 2003, Müller-Fauré/van Riet confirmed that health care systems based on in-
kind delivery were affected by the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. Here, the free movement of 
services in the ambulatory sector was explicitly extended to Member States operating their 
health care systems in the in-kind benefit modus: Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. 
The then following rulings further refined the jurisprudence and applied it to an 
additional group of countries without altering the cornerstones of the doctrine. In Inizan, the 
Court further detailed the application of Article 22(2) EC Regulation 1408/71 and Articles 49 
and 50 EC Treaty in that it held that if a treatment cannot be provided without undue delay, 
then referring patients abroad may not be refused. 
Leichtle clarified that health cures and their indirect benefits were also within the scope 
of the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence; however it allowed authorisation procedures under certain 
conditions. Even though the case concerned the German social security system, the UK in its 
observation tried to push the ECJ to declare that its National Health Service was different and 
                                          
20 See Working Committee of the Central Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Funds, Common press 
release, Sachleistungssystem entspricht Europarecht, 19 July 2001. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 22 of 38 
that the free movement of services thus did not apply to it (see ECJ, Bericht des 
Berichterstatters, Leichtle, para. 47).21 The attempt was made in vain, as will be seen below. 
In Keller, the ECJ decided, first, that insurance institutions were bound by the findings 
and decisions of those in other Member States in case of a referral abroad. Second, the Court 
held that “the cost of the treatment provided in that State must be borne by the institution of 
the Member State of stay in accordance with the legislation administered by that institution, 
under the same conditions as those applicable to insured persons covered by that legislation” 
(para. 72). 
In Watts, the Court explicitly extended the principle of free movement of services to 
Member States operating a national health system, i.e. to all the other Member States. In the 
proceedings before the ECJ, those Member States that had a national health system argued 
against the application of the Kohll/Decker principles to their systems (Finland, Ireland, Malta, 
Spain, Sweden, and the UK). However, France and Belgium argued in their observations, in 
consent with the European Commission, that the free movement of services also applied to 
national health systems (see ECJ, Report for the Hearing, Watts, paras 55 and 57). 
In Acereda Herrera, the last in this line of cases so far, the ECJ clarified that costs of 
travel, accommodation and subsistence were excluded from the scope of the Kohll/Decker 
jurisprudence. 
In Table 1, I provide an overview of the above described cases and the principles they 
prompted. 
                                          
21 In Leichtle, there was no oral hearing. Therefore, the report of the rapporteur substituted the report for the 
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Table 1: ECJ Introduction of New Material Doctrine and Relevance for EU Member States 
 
ECJ ruling 
Basic new material doctrines and their specifications 
introduced in the course of the jurisprudence 
EU Member States to 
which the jurisprudence 
was directly relevant 
Kohll and Decker 
To require prior authorisation in the ambulatory sector in 
cash benefit systems is an unjustified restriction of the 
free movement of services (Articles 49/50 EC) and the 




Specifies Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71: if prior 
authorisation has been wrongfully refused, the patient is 
entitled to be reimbursed directly by the insurance 
institution by an amount equivalent to that which would 
have been granted by the legislation of the state of 
residence if authorisation had been given in the first 
place; 
interprets Article 49 EC: if the reimbursement of medical 
costs incurred in a hospital in the Member State of 
treatment is less than the amount in the state of 
insurance, additional reimbursement covering the 
difference must be granted. 
All Member States 
Geraets-
Smits/Peerbooms 
A system of prior authorisation for the hospital sector 
may be justified; 
however, a system relying on prior authorisation has to 
meet certain criteria: national authorities have to take 
into account: all circumstances of each specific case, 
patient’s medical condition, and past record. 
The Netherlands, Germany, 
(Austria was at that time 




Extends the free movement of services to health care 
systems relying on benefits in-kind in ambulatory care; 
specifies what the ECJ meant by “undue delay”: national 
authorities have to take into account: circumstances of 
each specific case, patient’s medical condition, degree of 
pain, nature of the patient’s disability, and medical 
history. 
All social security systems 
based on cash 
reimbursement and in-kind 
benefits 
Inizan 
Specifies Article 22(2) Regulation 1408/71 and Articles 
49/50 EC: if treatment cannot be provided “without 
undue delay” referring patients abroad may not be 
refused. 
All Member States 
Leichtle  Articles 49/50 EC apply also to health cure costs.  All Member States 
Keller 
Specifies Article 22(1) Regulation 1408/71: the 
responsible institution in the state of insurance is bound 
by decisions of medical bodies in the state of treatment in 
case of prior authorisation through forms E111 or E112. 
All Member States 
Watts 
Extends the free movement of services to national health 
systems. 
National health systems 
Acereda Herrera 
Specifies Article 22 Regulation 1408/71: a right to be 
reimbursed for costs of travel, accommodation and 
subsistence is not conferred through prior authorisation 
with an E112 form. 
All Member States 
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3.3.  Member State Preoccupation with the Kohll/Decker Jurisprudence 
All “old” 15 EU Member States, without exception, commented either in a written or oral 
observation at one point or the other on the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence in the proceedings 
before the Court. Table 2 illustrates this extraordinary preoccupation with the patient mobility 
case law: in total 74 observations in ten cases.22 Kohll and Decker received a great deal of 
attention especially from Member States running a social security system, and to a lesser 
degree from national health systems. The interest in the follow-up cases was more equally 
distributed. Table 2 also indicates that legal and political mobilisation efforts by organised 
interest groups to push the jurisprudence forward were neither systematic nor strategic. Two 
aspects are striking: first, many Member States were involved with one or two cases: Belgium 
(1), France (1), Germany (1), Luxembourg (2), the Netherlands (2), Spain (2), and the UK (1). 
















                                          
22 In his chapter on Sex Equality Law (with Rachel Cichowski) Stone Sweet counted only 142 Member State 
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based on cash 
reimbursement
National health systems 
Case  Date of 
Judgement  Referring Court  D  A  NL F  B  L  DK SF GR IRL  I  P  E  S  UK
Decker 
C-120/95  28.04.1998
Conseil arbitral des 
assurances sociales 
(Luxembourg) 
                  
Kohll 
C-158/96  28.04.1998 Cour de Cassation
(Luxembourg)                  
Vanbraekel 
C-368/98  12.07.2001 Cour du travail de 














Centrale Raad van 
Beroep (the 
Netherlands) 




Affaires de sécurité 
sociale de Nanterre 
(France)






                 
Keller 
C-145/03  12.4.2005 
Juzgado de lo 
Social n
o 20 de 
Madrid (Spain) 
                
Watts 
C-372/04  16.5.2006 




                   
Acereda Herrera 
C-466/04  15.6.2006 
Tribunal Superior 
de Justicia de 
Cantabria (Spain) 
                 
Notes: The hatched cases stand for having commented with a written or oral observation in the specific case.                 
A=Austria, B=Belgium, DK=Denmark, SF=Finland, F=France, D=Germany, GR=Greece, IRL=Ireland, I=Italy, 
L=Luxembourg, NL= Netherlands, P=Portugal, E=Spain, S=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom. 
In the rulings Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré/van Riet, Norway and Iceland also submitted observations. 
In Acereda Herrera, Cyprus and Poland also submitted observations. In Watts, Malta and Poland also submitted 
observations. 
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3.4.  Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint  
In the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence we can see both judicial activism and self-restraint at work. 
The ECJ was an activist court in that it applied, against the unified interests of EU Member 
States, the basic freedoms of services and goods to health care and thereby challenged national 
welfare states. At the same time, when it came to the actual design of this intrusion into the 
domestic sphere of social protection, the Court exercised considerable self-restraint by 
limiting the impact of its decisions largely to the less costly ambulatory sector and by 
accepting – contrary to other policy areas – justifications of an economic nature for the 
restriction of free movement.23 
Why did the ECJ restrain itself? First, from the beginning most Member States reacted 
very negatively toward the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence and refused to implement it. Only with 
the ECJ’s fine-tuning and its application to one group of Member States while leaving the rest 
undecided did the united front of rejection start to crumble. The most visible sign of this 
development is the French position in the Watts proceeding. In earlier cases the French 
government had been fiercely opposed to the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it 
finally implemented the jurisprudence. In Watts, the French government did not back the 
position of the UK government and all the other national health systems but claimed that the 
Kohll/Decker jurisprudence also had to be applied to the national health systems. A second 
reason for the ECJ’s self-restraint was that the Member State reactions sensitised the Court to 
their concerns. It is plausible to assume that in the ECJ proceedings, Member State 
governments succeeded in persuading the Court of the peculiar nature of national social 
protection systems and the dangers of an unrestricted application of the basic freedoms, i.a. by 
                                          
23 Before the 1990s, the ECJ rejected in numerous cases that aims of an economic nature were able to justify 
restrictions of free movement (see e.g. Case C-352/85 para. 30; Case C-353/89 or Case C-398/95 para. 23). In its 
reasoning in Kohll and Decker the ECJ signalled a change in this orthodox position. The ECJ held in Kohll that 
the maintenance of a balanced medical and hospital service could fall within the grounds of public health under 
Article 46 EC (para. 50). The acceptance of justifications by the ECJ can best be seen in the follow-up 
jurisprudence in which the Court was interested in obtaining evidence from Member States with regard to the 
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providing empirical “evidence”.24 The ECJ thus seems to have recognised the sensitivities in 
this area, which is one of the last exclusive domains of the Member States. In return, Member 
States implemented the narrowed requirements of the jurisprudence, as will be seen in the 
following part. 
                                          
24 According to Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, the Dutch government informed the Court in the oral 
hearing in Müller-Fauré/van Riet that about 14.000 insured persons had made use of treatment abroad although 
prior authorisation was still required (see his Opinion) (http://curia.europa.eu). Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 28 of 38 
4. FINE-TUNING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION: 
GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM25 
In Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK) the fine-tuning of the jurisprudence by 
the ECJ – and along with that ECJ self-restraint – influenced implementation processes and 
outcomes, though to differing degrees. 
 
4.1.  Germany  
In Germany, Kohll and Decker were seen as an example of “activist” ECJ policy-making. Horst 
Seehofer, German Federal Minister of Health, commented on Kohll and Decker in a press 
release on the very day they were issued. He considered them to be highly problematic.26 In 
the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers, Seehofer was less 
diplomatic and, according to participants, called for the immediate revision of the rulings. The 
German Ministry of Health, most of the statutory health insurance funds and also medical 
associations perceived the rulings as an intrusion into a sphere that was held to be under 
exclusive control of the Member States: the organisation of the fundamental principles of the 
social protection system. They feared that not only ambulatory but also unlimited and 
unconditioned mobility in the hospital sector would be triggered by the ECJ decisions. In this 
case the political and, more importantly, financial costs would have been considerable. 
Therefore, as a matter of principle, they initially rejected the entire jurisprudence on patient 
mobility. In the proceedings before the Court in the follow-up cases, the German government 
reiterated its position that health care services were not of an economic nature.27 If the Court 
was to decide differently, the German government found prior authorisation procedures 
justified in the hospital sector. 
                                          
25 A more detailed account of the impact of the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence on administrative practices and social 
codes in Germany, France and the UK can be found in Obermaier (2008). 
26 See Federal Ministry of Health, Press release, Eine Auszehrung der deutschen Krankenversicherung muß 
verhindert werden, No 28, 28 April 1998. 
27 After the ECJ delivered Müller-Fauré/van Riet in 2003, Germany stopped commenting on the follow-up cases 
(see Table 2). Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 29 of 38 
In the follow-up rulings, notably Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms (2001) and Müller-
Fauré/van Riet (2003), the ECJ confined the scope of the jurisprudence de facto to the 
ambulatory sector, i.e. the Court extended the scope in principle to hospital cases, however, 
only under restrictive conditions. This narrowing down of the original broad Kohll/Decker 
doctrines convinced the German Ministry of Health and the other health care actors that the 
ECJ, first, acknowledged the complexities and specificities of domestic health care systems 
and, second, took into account Member States’ concerns about the Kohll/Decker 
jurisprudence. Consequently, the scepticism toward the ECJ in general, and the Kohll/Decker 
jurisprudence in particular, decreased substantially. The self-restrained ECJ approach thus 
helped to overcome the most abrasive lines of resistance and paved the way for implementing 
the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. 
Despite the initial resistance, in 2003, the German government incorporated the 
requirements of the jurisprudence into its fifth book of the social code (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB) 
with the help of the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act. Then, as a matter of 
principle, insured persons were entitled to care providers in other Member States of the 
EU/EEA28, and also entitled to choose cash instead of in-kind benefits in general, i.e. for all 
health care entitlements. In compliance with the ECJ jurisprudence, however, several 
important restrictions were built into the law. First, cash reimbursement was limited to 
ambulatory care. Hospital care abroad remained dependent on prior authorisation by the 
competent insurance fund. Second, before reimbursing, the insurance funds must deduct 
costs for administrative additional work and expenses and costs for the missing efficiency 
controls as well as other extra payments. Third, before choosing cash instead of in-kind 
benefits, the insured persons have to consult the insurance funds, and they have to stick to 
their choice for at least one year. Because of these conditionalities, the impact of the legislative 
changes was limited. 
                                          
28 The European Economic Area (EEA) was founded in 1994. It comprises the EU Member States and the three 
EFTA Member States: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 30 of 38 
4.2.  France 
In France, the constant refinement of the jurisprudence was not decisive for the pace of the 
implementation, but all the more for the outcome. The French case Inizan (2003), which was 
part of the fine-tuning process, was an additional element to take into account for the French 
government but not of great importance. Since the ECJ narrowed down the original doctrines, 
the changes in the French social code remained minor. The French government incorporated 
the requirements of the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence into its social codes (Code de la Sécurité 
Sociale, CSS; Code de la Santé Publique, CSP) in a slow and gradual process. Through circulars 
that invalidated or complemented preceding circulars, the French government adapted the 
CSS and CSP step by step. Finally, in 2005, new articles were inserted into the CSS (R. 332-3 to 
6), in which for the first time, non-EU/EEA and EU/EEA cases were treated differently. 
Treatment can now be obtained in any EU/EEA Member State and reimbursement has to be 
provided. However, following the ECJ jurisprudence, unconditional reimbursement of costs 
incurred abroad was confined to ambulatory health care. In addition, in Articles L. 6211-2-1 
and R. 6211-46 to 56 of the CSP, the French government determined that EU/EEA 
laboratories could offer their services to French patients under the same conditions as French 
providers. Overall, similar to Germany, the impact of the rulings was limited. 
 
4.3.  The United Kingdom  
The UK government, similar to Germany and France, rejected the Kohll and Decker rulings 
and their transferability to the National Health Service (NHS). The refinement of the 
jurisprudence by the ECJ influenced both the implementation process and outcome in the 
UK. Vanbraekel and particularly Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms clarified in 2001 that, first, in-kind 
benefit systems fell within the scope of the free movement of services, and that, second, if a 
Member State could not provide a treatment “without undue delay,” it had to refer the patient 
to another Member State. Because of the NHS logic of rationing health care, waiting times for Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 31 of 38 
an operation were extremely long for UK patients.29 The question of what “undue delay” 
meant in practice was therefore of great importance to the UK government. The rulings 
Vanbraekel and Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms forced the UK to set in motion the first 
implementation steps in 2001/02. First, it repealed Section 5(2)(b) of the NHS Act from 1977 
and gave the Secretary of State the possibility to contract with health care providers from 
abroad. In addition, the UK government amended Paragraph 15(A) of the NHS and 
Community Care Act from 1990. Second, the UK government started a centrally planned 
pilot scheme for treating patients overseas and amended the travel regulations. The ECJ 
follow-up ruling Müller-Fauré/van Riet in 2003 had additional direct consequences for the UK 
case Watts. The first-instance Administrative Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of the 
High Court ruled in Watts that Müller-Fauré/van Riet was applicable to the NHS. Although 
the government appealed the national court decision, it set further steps toward compliance: it 
developed detailed guidance to the public and to local health care commissioners on 
managing requests for overseas treatment and it reimbursed patients who received health care 
abroad on a discretionary basis. However, due to the restrained ECJ approach, the impact of 
the rulings was also minor in the UK. 
To sum up, the ECJ’s fine-tuning influenced the implementation process in Germany, to a 
lesser degree in the UK. More importantly, the implementation outcome was affected by the 
fine-tuning of the Kohll and Decker rulings. All three countries allowed patient mobility to a 
certain degree, but only under restrictive conditions. Since the ECJ narrowed down the 
doctrinal content of the original rulings and limited the scope de facto to ambulatory care, the 
actual effect diminished accordingly. Ultimately, the tremendous impact which was postulated 
by legal and political science scholarship, that is the massive change of the institutional 
configuration of domestic health care systems, did not come true. 
                                          
29 High waiting times for treatment were a central problem identified within the NHS. The government admitted 
in 2000 that „[a]t present the average wait to see a consultant for an outpatient appointment is seven weeks and 
the average time that people have been waiting for an operation is three months. But some people wait much 
longer than this – up to 18 months for inpatient treatment – and it is this which so concerns the public” 
(Department of Health, The NHS Plan, July 2000: 103). Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 32 of 38 
5. A MORE ENCOMPASSING MODEL OF JUDICIAL POLITICS  
Against the background of the empirical evidence presented above, the existing models of 
judicial politics have to be revised. They did take into consideration to a certain extent 
interactions between the ECJ, national courts, and private litigants, as well as the impact of 
these relationships on doctrinal outcomes. However, they did not assess legislative outcomes 
and the interaction between the follow-up rulings and the outcomes. The model proposed in 
this paper incorporates the interaction between the ECJ’s fine-tuning and implementation 
processes at the Member State level. 
I argue that the gradual fine-tuning of the content and scope of a ruling through the 
ECJ shapes the implementation behaviour and implementation outcome of Member States. 
The Court first establishes a new doctrine for a specific country case. Then, in order to 
guarantee its uniform application across the EU in the follow-up rulings, it tailors the doctrine 
and its consequences to the systems of other EU Member States. This on-going development, 
i.e. the fine-tuning of the jurisprudence (restriction and extension of the material doctrines) 
by the ECJ, is an important intervening variable that contributes, first, to the willingness of 
Member States to implement Court rulings and, second, to the pace of implementation.30 The 
fine-tuning may kick-start, accelerate, or help finalize an implementation process, and this 
happens for three reasons: First, the refinement of the jurisprudence by the ECJ provides 
Member States with more information on what is required to comply with a ruling. The 
judicial uncertainty caused by a first ECJ ruling, which postulates new legal principles, 
decreases step by step with each subsequent ruling. However, follow-up rulings may also raise 
new questions. Second, with increased information on the scope of new ECJ doctrines, the 
potential and actual financial, administrative and political costs of the implementation of the 
Court ruling become more predictable for Member States. Third, in the process of fine-tuning 
its jurisprudence, the ECJ is responsive to criticism and practical problems that emerge in the 
                                          
30  Other relevant variables to explain Member State compliance are: goodness-of-fit, domestic political 
preferences, national court rulings, as well as management and enforcement activities of the European 
Commission. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 33 of 38 
follow-up cases. To guarantee Member States’ compliance, the ECJ is ready to exercise 
considerable self-restraint with regard to the concrete design of its doctrines. 
The scope of the proposed model of judicial politics claims, however, only limited 
application. It particularly applies to policy fields which are of utmost importance to EU 
Member States. Social policy belongs to the core duties and responsibilities of Member States. 
Every EU-level intervention in this domain is seen as an unjustified intrusion. A second scope 
condition is that the proposed model does not apply to all ECJ rulings equally. The ECJ may 
also clarify a question in only one singular ruling without the need for further follow-up cases. 
However, most ECJ rulings seem to be part of longer series of cases. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 34 of 38 
6. CONCLUSION 
Legal and, even more so, political science scholars expected a considerable impact of the Kohll 
and Decker rulings on domestic social protection systems. Scholars based this assessment on 
the far-reaching doctrines of the rulings. However, the scholarly and political criticism and 
concerns were absorbed by the ECJ in its follow-up cases which fine-tuned the Kohll and 
Decker principles. Consequently, the actual impact was minor compared to what was 
postulated. 
Pierson distinguished between several types of slow-moving processes, one of them 
being a “cumulative” type, where a “change in a variable is continuous but extremely gradual” 
(2004: 82). The ECJ’s fine-tuning in the case of Kohll and Decker could be understood as such 
a process, in which the variable, the doctrines of the jurisprudence, changed gradually. 
Scholarly research has to take into account this slow-moving process of the fine-tuning of the 
jurisprudence by the ECJ. The impact of rulings with new doctrinal principles on the Member 
State level has to be seen against the background of this process. 
By not paying adequate attention to the slow-moving process of the ECJ’s fine-tuning, 
scholars may overestimate the doctrinal content in rulings while missing the narrowing down 
of this content. The Kohll/Decker jurisprudence, which forms the essence of this paper, is 
certainly a good example for the potential effects of such an omitted variable bias on 
research.31 However, this is certainly not the only example. Recent important social policy 
cases such as Laval and Viking32 on collective trade union action and Rüffert33 on the posting 
of workers, run the same risk of being systematically overestimated with regard to their 
impact on Member States. 
                                          
31 According to Henry Brady and David Collier, an omitted variable bias exists „when a theoretically relevant 
explanatory variable is missing.“ As a consequence „the causal estimate for any given variable that is included 
may be too large, in which case the causal effect attributed to the included variable is at least partially spurious” 
(2004: 296). 
32 For the Laval and Viking rulings see e.g. Falkner and Obermaier (2008). 
33 Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert vs. Land Niedersachsen [2008], not yet reported. Working Paper No: 02/2008     Page 35 of 38 
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